Printable · GCSE Higher · ages 14-16
Probability worksheet — GCSE Higher
Fifteen questions across the probability statements at Higher tier. Choose the non-calculator filter to rehearse Paper 1, which counts for a third of the marks.
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Answer key: Probability worksheet — GCSE Higher
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- (b) £100 — Over 250 games, the expected total winnings are 250 × (1/5) × £12 = £600, since a player wins on 1 of the 5 equally likely sections. The total cost of playing is 250 × £2 = £500. The players' expected profit is the winnings minus the cost: £600 − £500 = £100. Writing £500 is wrong because that is only the total cost of playing, without any winnings included. Writing £600 is wrong because that is only the total expected winnings, without subtracting what was paid to play. Writing £2,500 is wrong because it assumes a win on every single game (250 × £12 = £3,000) instead of using the 1-in-5 probability, then subtracts the cost: £3,000 − £500 = £2,500. The players' expected profit over the 250 games is £100.
- (a) 70 — Method: two linked steps. Find the expected number of billing calls first, then take the 35% of those, because the 35% is quoted for billing calls only. Working: 40% of 500 is 200 billing calls. 35% of 200 is 70 calls. Answer: you would expect 70 calls. The distractors: 200 stops after the first step and gives the billing calls, forgetting that only some of them are dealt with quickly; 175 is 35% of 500, applying the quick response rate to every call the centre takes rather than to the billing calls only; 375 comes from adding 40% and 35% to get 75% and taking 75% of 500, which treats two stages of one journey as separate outcomes to be added.
- (a) 6.75% — Finishing, retiring and being disqualified are exhaustive, so the three percentages sum to 100%: 100% − 68.5% − 24.75% = 6.75%. Adding the two given percentages instead of subtracting them from 100% gives 68.5% + 24.75% = 93.25%, the combined probability of finishing or retiring, not of being disqualified. Subtracting only the retiring percentage from 100% and forgetting the finishing percentage gives 100% − 24.75% = 75.25%. Subtracting only the finishing percentage and forgetting the retiring percentage gives 100% − 68.5% = 31.50%.
- (b) Organiser favoured — expected pay-out is under £1 — The expected pay-out per game is the prize times the probability of winning: £4 × 1/5 = £0.80. The expected income per game is the £1 entry fee, which the organiser collects regardless of the result. Since £0.80 is less than £1, the game favours the organiser, because the expected pay-out is under £1. The claim that the game favours the player, because the pay-out is over £1, is wrong on both counts — the pay-out is not over £1, and it is the organiser who benefits. The claim that the organiser is favoured because the pay-out is over £1 reaches the right side but the wrong reason: £0.80 is under £1, not over it. The claim that the two expected amounts are equal is also wrong: £0.80 and £1 are different amounts, so the game is not fair to both sides.
- (b) The relative frequency is settling near 0.5 — Method: turn each result into a relative frequency before comparing them, because it is the relative frequency, and not the difference between the two counts, that tends towards the theoretical probability. Working: after 10 flips the relative frequency of a head is 7 ÷ 10 = 0.7, which is a long way from 0.5. After 1000 flips it is 528 ÷ 1000 = 0.528, which is much closer to 0.5. Meanwhile the gap between the two counts has grown rather than shrunk: it was 7 − 3 = 4 after 10 flips and is 528 − 472 = 56 after 1000 flips. Answer: the relative frequency is settling near 0.5, which is what an unbiased experiment does as the sample grows. The distractors: saying the counts are levelling out is the usual form of this idea and the figures contradict it, since the gap went from 4 to 56; saying the coin is biased treats 28 extra heads in 1000 flips as proof, when 0.528 sits close to 0.5 and a fair coin gives results like this often; saying the next flip is more likely to be a tail is the gambler's fallacy, since each flip stays at 1/2 whatever came before.
- (b) 3/10 — The number who use at least one app is 90 − 20 = 70. Since 55 + 42 double-counts the overlap, n(X ∩ Y) = 55 + 42 − 70 = 27, so P(both) = 27/90 = 3/10. Forgetting to subtract the 20 who use neither, and using the full 90 as the union, gives 55 + 42 − 90 = 7, so 7/90. Reporting the probability of using X or Y (or both), 70/90 = 7/9, answers a different question about the union, not the overlap. Reporting the probability of using neither app, 20/90 = 2/9, is the complement of the union, not the intersection.
- (b) 0.55 — Method: it is easier to find the probability that Ffion wins NEITHER stage, then subtract that from 1. Working: P(lose stage 1) = 1 − 0.4 = 0.6, and P(lose stage 2) = 1 − 0.25 = 0.75. P(neither) = 0.6 × 0.75 = 0.45. P(at least one) = 1 − 0.45 = 0.55. Answer: 0.55. Watch out: adding the two win probabilities, 0.4 + 0.25 = 0.65, treats winning both as impossible and overcounts — that is not how independent probabilities combine. Multiplying the two win probabilities, 0.4 × 0.25 = 0.1, gives the probability of winning BOTH stages, not at least one. And stopping at 0.45, the probability of winning neither stage, forgets the final step of subtracting from 1.
- (b) 37/75 — There are 150 − 84 = 66 men. 84 − 50 = 34 women prefer weight training, and 40 men prefer weight training, so 34 + 40 = 74 people in total prefer weight training, out of 150: 74/150 = 37/75. Writing 4/15 is wrong because it only counts the men who prefer weight training (40/150, simplified), leaving out the 34 women. Writing 17/75 is wrong because it only counts the women who prefer weight training (34/150, simplified), leaving out the 40 men. Writing 37/42 is wrong because it uses the number of women (84) as the denominator instead of the whole gym (150) — 74/84 simplifies to 37/42, but that is not a probability out of the whole group. The probability is 37/75.
- (d) 136 — 15% of 160 = 0.15 × 160 = 24 patients reported side effects, so 160 − 24 = 136 did not. Stopping after finding the number who reported side effects, 24, answers the wrong question — it is not the number who did NOT report them. Misreading '15%' as a raw count of 15 patients, rather than a percentage, gives 160 − 15 = 145. Subtracting 15% of 160 twice, 160 − 24 − 24 = 112, double-counts the side-effect group.
- (b) 70 — Saloon, estate and hatchback are exhaustive, so their probabilities sum to 1: the probability of a hatchback is 1 − 0.28 − 0.37 = 0.35. The number of hatchbacks is 0.35 × 200 = 70. Treating the SUM of the other two probabilities, 0.28 + 0.37 = 0.65, as the probability of a hatchback instead of its complement gives 0.65 × 200 = 130. Multiplying the correct probability, 0.35, by 100 instead of the 200 cars actually surveyed gives 35. Averaging the two given probabilities, (0.28 + 0.37) ÷ 2 = 0.325, instead of subtracting them from 1, and then multiplying by 200 gives 65.
- (a) 0.45, different from 0.4 for all the households — Method: work out the probability inside the restricted group of garden owners, then work out the probability across the whole survey, and compare the two. Working: 54 of the 120 households with a garden own a dog, so the conditional probability is 54 divided by 120, which is 0.45. Across the whole survey 80 of the 200 households own a dog, which is 0.4. Since 0.45 is not 0.4, having a garden changes the chance of owning a dog and the two events are not independent. Answer: 0.45, different from 0.4 for all the households. The distractors: 0.27 is 54/200, dividing the households with both by the whole survey instead of by the 120 with a garden; 0.675 is 54/80, the probability that a household has a garden given that it owns a dog, which is the condition and the event the wrong way round; 0.4 is 80/200, the probability of owning a dog with the garden information never used, which is why that route also reports no difference.
- (b) 0.0309 — Method: P(both defective | at least one defective) = P(both defective) ÷ P(at least one defective). Find each using independence: P(both) = 0.06², P(at least one) = 1 − P(neither) = 1 − 0.94². Working: P(both) = 0.06² = 0.0036. P(neither) = 0.94² = 0.8836, so P(at least one) = 1 − 0.8836 = 0.1164. P(both | at least one) = 0.0036 ÷ 0.1164 = 0.0309 (3 s.f.). Answer: 0.0309. Watch out: leaving the answer as 0.0036 gives P(both defective) itself, not the probability once you already know at least one is defective — you still need to divide by P(at least one defective). Giving 0.0600 answers with the single-component defect rate, ignoring the condition altogether. And 0.5000 assumes that 'at least one' makes the outcomes 'exactly one defective' and 'both defective' equally likely, which is not how these probabilities combine.
- (c) 0.15 — Method: for two independent events, multiply along the branches of the tree to find the probability of both outcomes happening together. Working: P(red and heads) = P(red) × P(heads) = 0.3 × 0.5 = 0.15. Answer: 0.15. Watch out: adding the two probabilities, 0.3 + 0.5 = 0.8, does not give the probability of both — probabilities along one path of a tree are multiplied, not added. Writing down 0.5 ignores the spinner altogether and gives only the coin's probability. And writing down 0.65 is the probability of red OR heads, which is 0.3 + 0.5 − 0.15 = 0.65, a different question from the one asked here.
- (c) Noah — 11/32 = 0.34375, above 34%. — Converting 11/32 to a decimal gives 11 ÷ 32 = 0.34375, which is greater than 34% (0.34), so Noah has the better save rate: 'Noah — 11/32 = 0.34375, above 34%.' Comparing the raw numbers 34 and 11 directly, without converting the fraction to the same form, gives 'Elin — 34 is bigger than 11.' Treating a larger denominator as meaning a bigger value, rather than smaller equal shares, gives 'Noah — 32 is a bigger denominator.' Rounding 34.375% to 34% to the nearest whole percent hides the difference and gives 'Equal — both round to 34% to the nearest percent.'
- (c) 100 — There are 3 even numbers on a fair dice (2, 4 and 6), so the probability of landing on an even number is 3/6 = 1/2, and 300 × 1/2 = 150. The probability of landing on a six is 1/6, so 300 × 1/6 = 50. The dice is expected to land on an even number 150 − 50 = 100 more times than on a six. Writing 50 is wrong because that is just the expected number of sixes on its own, without comparing it to the expected number of evens. Writing 150 is wrong because that is just the expected number of evens on its own, without subtracting the sixes. Writing 200 is wrong because it adds the two expected frequencies together (150 + 50 = 200) instead of finding the difference between them. The dice is expected to land on an even number 100 more times than on a six.
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